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value. We investigate different aspects of ownership: the risk of political interference, 
private investors vs. the state acting as influential blockholders, and preferential 
political treatment of companies. Using a unique dataset of Polish partial privatizations 
initiated by shares transfers to entities under limited government influence, we find that 
government divestments can enhance company value, due to reduction in risk of 
political interference. A potential increase in the liquidity of trades in transferred 
companies’ shares also boosts their market value. On the other hand, an increased 
likelihood of the emergence of private blockholders able to expropriate minority 
shareholders reduces the firm’s market value. Our results support the political view of 
privatization: governments have objectives different to profit maximization, which 
leads to suboptimal investment from this point of view and lower market value of 
companies. We also develop a model to empirically distinguish between different 
aspects of ownership on company value.  
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1. Introduction and literature review 
This paper analyzes stock market reactions to announcements of (potential) partial 
privatizations using an unusual mode of state divesture: transfers of shares under direct 
government control to other entities, being under limited influence from politicians, which 
subsequently sell the transferred stocks to private investors. Specifically, since 1999 the Polish 
government used stocks of partly privatized companies to increase the capitalization of 
troubled state-owned enterprises (SOEs), other partly privatized companies, or government 
agencies.
1
 In addition, even if those transferred stocks were expected to be returned at a later 
stage, the direct influence of the government over the transferred company would diminish, at 
least temporarily. In reality, however, the transfers have not been returned. Rather, recipients 
used to sell the received stocks to improve their financial condition. Hence, as these transfers 
ended up in hands of private investors, this de facto constitute a mode of  privatization.  
On theoretical grounds, the impact of state divestures on firm value is ambiguous.
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Potential benefits for affected companies include: a reduction in political interference (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994), higher stock market liquidity and, hence, lower liquidity risk in the long 
run (Amihud, 2002), and a higher likelihood that a private controlling investor will emerge 
(Maug, 1998). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the reactions of stock market 
participants to stock transfer announcements analysed here were overwhelmingly negative, 
since it was feared that large portions of shares would be sold and depress the market price. In 
addition, privatized firms are unlikely to benefit from preferential political treatment (Sun et 
al., 2002), and state divesture can lead to dispersed ownership (Zingales, 1995).  
Differences in performance between state-owned and private enterprises are analysed 
based on the notion of the company as a bundle of ownership and control rights (Berle and 
Means, 1932). The ownership-based argument, termed the political view, states that 
governments might pursue goals other than profit maximization, such as higher employment, 
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investment in certain regions or products, or high but unsustainable dividend payouts (Gupta, 
2005; Sheshinski and López-Calva, 2003). Hence, transferring the ownership, i.e., the formal 
right to interfere with managerial decisions, to private investors can change the goals imposed 
on the management by the new owner, improving the privatized company’s efficiency (both 
allocative and X-efficiency [Leibensten, 1966]) and profits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).
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The second argument for private vs. state ownership, the managerial view, recognises 
that the government and the taxpayers are facing information asymmetries and high 
transaction costs of monitoring and incentivising the management of the SOEs (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988, 1991). As a result, the actual principals find it difficult to influence the actions 
of their agents, resulting in opportunistic behaviour by the latter. This can take the form of 
managerial perks, investment policy driven by private goals, etc., and is detrimental to the 
company’s value. On the other hand, private investors have both incentives and means to 
control and discipline managers (Shleifer, 1998; Tirole, 1991). Further, the stock market might 
act as a monitoring and controlling device, by delivering information about the company 
which is unavailable from accounting data, allowing the owners to better shape incentives 
faced by management (Holmström and Tirole, 1993). Hence, privatization may improve 
corporate performance by introducing new mechanisms of monitoring and control: stock 
market valuation of managerial decisions, different legal framework, actions of analysts and 
shareholders, the market for corporate control, and the managerial labour market.
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Empirical studies show that privatization improves firms’ performance and value, but 
the results vary and depend on the type of private owner, privatization mode, as well as the 
legal and macroeconomic framework (Megginson and Netter, 2001, Djankov and Murrell, 
2002; Estrin et al., 2007; Konings et al., 2005, Driffield and Du, 2007). Despite potential 
benefits, governments around the world are reluctant to conduct full privatizations and retain 
shares in partially privatized companies (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2004).
5
  This type of firms is 
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analyzed in this study. However, theoretical arguments regarding the owner’s incentives and 
ability to monitor managers speak against partial, as opposed to full, privatization (D’Souza et 
al., 2005, García and Ansón, 2007; Sheshinski and López-Calva, 2003). Empirical evidence is 
in line with this prediction: returns and subsequent performance following privatization IPOs 
are lower when governments remain majority shareholders (Boubakri et al., 2005a; Frydman 
et al, 1999, Jelic et al., 2003); politically connected managers diminish firm value (Fan et al., 
2007), even if companies benefit from subsidies and lower taxation (Faccio, 2006); and the 
existence of non-managerial private blockholders benefits privatized companies (Lins, 2003).  
This paper analyses the relative importance of managerial and political views of 
ownership. The majority of privatization studies deal with simultaneous changes in ownership 
and monitoring; therefore, they do not allow to distinguish between the political and the 
managerial view. However, knowing which of these aspects makes privatization work is of 
crucial importance for both policy makers and investors (Gupta, 2005): if the managerial view 
holds, partial privatisations could be sufficient to fully improve firms’ performance; if the 
political view holds, however, full privatisations are required to entirely unleash firms’ 
potential. Empirical studies (Section 2) point towards the managerial rather than political view; 
however, these two aspects are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Gupta, 2005). 
The contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, we empirically analyze the 
impact of an unusual mode of state divestures on firm value, providing new evidence on how 
changes in ownership affect the value of companies, especially on the role of the state and the 
blockholders. We test for the political view of ownership while controlling for the managerial 
view. Secondly, we show analytically how one can empirically distinguish between different 
factors determining the firm value, such as political interference, concentrated ownership by 
state or private investors, and preferential political treatment. Lastly, we use a unique, hand-
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collected dataset, which helps to avoid the data mining bias that could potentially result from 
repeated utilization of popular databases in other studies. 
Our findings yield support for the political view of privatization: State divestures tend 
to increase companies’ market value due to reduction in political interference. Further, the 
stock market reacts positively to a potential increase in future liquidity of stocks of firms 
subject to transfers. These positive aspects contrast with potential negative consequences of 
privatization: emergence of blockholders expropriating small shareholders, more dispersed 
ownership, and loss of preferential political treatment. The total impact of privatisations on 
firm’s market value depends on which of those effects dominates. 
In the next section, we review the literature on selected aspects of privatization and 
formulate our hypotheses. Next, we describe the data, methodology, and testing strategy. 
Section 4 presents empirical results and their interpretation, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses and testing strategy 
2.1. Ownership-related effects 
Privatization might be expected to change a company’s performance because it entails changes 
in ownership (political view), and/or because capital markets constitute a device which allows 
the shareholders to monitor and control the managers (managerial view). Since we are dealing 
with companies which were listed prior to the transfers, the latter aspect, i.e., the stock market 
as a controlling mechanism, was in place prior to the transfers. Hence, any changes in market 
value observed here will be interpreted as evidence related to the political view (a similar 
reasoning is employed by Bortolotti and Faccio, 2004, and Gupta, 2005).
6
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The literature reports stronger support for the managerial, as opposed to the political, 
view. The former can be assessed by analyzing partial privatizations through public share 
offerings, whereby state ownership declines from 100% to a non-negative fraction. Studies 
show that efficiency improves following share issue privatization (Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; 
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Boubakri et al., 2005a; D'Souza and Megginson, 1999; Megginson et al., 1994). However, 
because both full and partial privatizations (and private sales) are dealt with in these studies, 
the results in support of the managerial view should be interpreted with caution, as they might 
be due to changes in ownership (political view) rather than in the extent of private control.  
In addition, some studies argue that post-privatization improvements are more 
pronounced for firms with majority private ownership, pointing towards the political view 
(Boubakri et al., 2005a; D'Souza and Megginson, 1999). However, as they only focus on 
whether the state ownership drops below the 50% mark, detailed conclusions about the impact 
of often minor changes in ownership on corporate performance are not possible. Those studies 
which control for the exact level of post-privatization state ownership find it insignificant in 
both developed (D'Souza et al., 2005) and developing (Boubakri et al., 2004) countries, 
suggesting that once market-based control mechanisms have been introduced, further 
privatization does not improve performance (supporting the managerial view), or even harms it 
(Bortolotti and Faccio, 2004). Hence, we formulate two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis H1. The level of private ownership affects a firm’s value (political view); 
Hypothesis H2. Introduction of private control affects a firm’s value (managerial view). 
If H1 holds, we should observe significant market reactions to the announcements of 
stock transfers (positive reactions if increased private ownership improves company 
performance and negative if it harms it). However, if H2 is the sole correct effect (or if 
privatisation leads to greater inefficiencies, see endnote 3), we should not observe any 
systematic market reactions to further (potential partial) privatizations, as companies in our 
sample are publically traded and already benefit from private control mechanisms.
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Furthermore, if H1 holds, the literature offers several explanations for the impact of 
ownership on firm’s market value. Below we explain how they can be distinguished. 
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Hypothesis H1A. State ownership reduces firm value due to political interference with 
managerial decisions.  
If the political interference hypothesis (H1A) holds, we further theorise that the 
government is more likely to interfere if it holds a sufficiently large fraction of shares, but 
should not be able to do so if its holdings are small. In addition, high levels of state ownership 
signal the government’s interest in interfering. Hence, if the hypothesis H1A is correct, the 
market value of a company should be a negative function of state ownership, especially so for 
high levels of government’s shareholding. We describe this relationship by the following 
stylized function of market value (MV) on state ownership (G) shown in Figure 1, Panel A:
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where p1 is a constant to assure the continuity of the function MV at point (K1, MV(K1)), and 
K1 is a threshold value of state ownership G separating ‘low’ from ‘high’ values of state 
ownership. K1 could be equal to 50% plus one share, since owning marginally more than a half 
of the company would guarantee the government the majority of votes, or cold be lower if the 
remaining shareholders were numerous and inactive.
10
  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
An addition aspect is that of ownership concentration. Based on the agency theory, it 
can be argued that highly concentrated ownership might be better than diluted one: block-
holders face lower per-stock-held costs of obtaining, processing, and acting upon information 
about the company, and receive higher total benefits than small shareholders. Hence, their 
incentives to actively monitor the management are stronger, helping to overcome the problem 
of information asymmetry between shareholders and managers and to improve the quality of 
managerial decisions. As a result, concentrated ownership might be better than diluted one, 
even if it is the state who acts as a blockholder (Tirole, 1991). These considerations lead to: 
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Hypothesis H1B. State ownership increases  firm value due to the benefits of concentrated 
(state) ownership. 
The detrimental effect of ownership dilution on a firm’s value is well established in the 
empirical literature. For instance, Zingales (1995) reports a positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and corporate performance in the US, and numerous studies show 
this relationship to hold in the transition economies as well (e.g., Earle and Estrin [1996], Xu 
and Wang [1997], Claessens and Djankow [1999]). However, these papers do not distinguish 
between state and private ownership.  
The notion that the government can act as a blockholder improving the firm’s 
performance finds some support in empirical studies. In their meta-analysis of the privatization 
effects on enterprise restructuring in transition economies, Djankov and Murrell (2002) report 
that dispersed private ownership is not superior to full state ownership, as privatization to 
“diffused individuals” failed to significantly improve the company’s performance. However, 
this finding could also be driven by preferential treatment of these companies by the 
governments (as hypothesized by Bortolotti and Faccio [2004]). 
Hence, for high levels of state ownership, the decision to transfer shares from direct 
state control could cause a dilution of ownership and is hypothesized to lower the firm’s value. 
The higher the state’s initial stake, the smaller this potential damage and the weaker the 
(negative) market reaction would be. For low levels of state ownership, the transfer decision is 
irrelevant since the state cannot act as a blockholder anyway. Therefore the concentrated state 
ownership hypothesis (H1B) would predict a positive relationship between state ownership 
and the company’s market value for firms with high levels of state ownership, and no 
relationship for low levels of government shareholding (Figure 1, Panel B). This can be 
described by the following stylized function of market value (MV) of state ownership (G): 
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where p2 is a constant and K2 is a threshold value of state ownership G separating ‘low’ from 
‘high’ values of state ownership, which does not have to be equal to K1.  
On the other hand, when state ownership is already low, the government cannot act as a 
controlling owner. Hence, the decision to further privatize the company could increase the 
firm’s value because it increases the number of shares in the free float and the probability that 
a private block owner will emerge (Maug, 1998).
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 Furthermore, the lower the state ownership, 
the higher this probability is. This leads to: 
Hypothesis H1C. Private ownership increases  firm value due to the benefits of concentrated 
(private) ownership. 
Hypothesis H1C further predicts a negative relationship between state ownership and a 
company’s value for firms with low levels of state ownership.
12
 For high levels of government 
shareholding, the fraction of the company which might be held by a private shareholder would 
be insufficient for the latter to act as a blockholder, hence we would expect state ownership to 
be unrelated to the market value of a company (Figure 1, Panel C). This can be described by 
the following stylized function:  
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where p3 is a constant and K3 is a threshold value of state ownership G separating ‘low’ from 
‘high’ values of state ownership, which does not have to be equal to K1 or K2.
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However, the impact of private block ownership on firm value can also be negative, 
due to “private benefits of control” allowing the blockholders to expropriate remaining 
shareholders, to exaggerated control reducing risk-taking by managers, or to increased risk 
borne by large shareholders (Grosfeld and Hashi, 2007, Trojanowski, 2008). Hence, the 
relationship (1C) could be inversed, i.e., low levels of government ownership giving rise to 
higher probability of emergence of private blockholders could reduce the value of 
companies.
14
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Lastly, state ownership can influence the market value of companies because of a 
higher likelihood of preferential treatment in the form of tax releases, cheap loans, subsidies, 
public contracts, etc., for companies with large state ownership, potentially resulting in the 
spurious superiority of state ownership (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2004; Sheshinski and López-
Calva, 2003; Sun et al., 2002). For those firms in Central Europe facing hard budget 
constraints and unlikely to receive state support, Frydman et al. (1999) show that partially 
privatized corporations perform no better than SOEs and significantly worse than fully private 
firms. This finding suggests that the alleged beneficial effects of state ownership reported in 
other studies might result from preferential political treatment of the firms rather than from 
their superior performance due to, e.g., the government acting as a blockholder. Hence: 
Hypothesis H1D. State ownership increases  firm value due to preferential political treatment. 
Under H1D, we would expect the market reactions to privatization announcements to 
be negative, especially when preferential treatment was most likely to occur, i.e., for firms 
with high levels of state ownership. This would result in a positive relationship between state 
ownership and the market values of companies. This effect would be especially pronounced 
for high values of state ownership, as by remaining a major shareholder, the government 
implicitly signals its interest in a company, making preferential political treatment more likely 
to occur. The effect of this preferential political treatment hypothesis (H1D) is shown in Figure 
1, Panel D, and can be described by the following stylized function: 
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where p4 is a constant and K4 is a threshold value of state ownership G separating ‘low’ from 
‘high’ values of state ownership which does not have to be equal to K1-K3.  
To summarise, the market value of a company might be linked to state ownership via 
four different channels (H1A-H1D).  Therefore, we can express the market value MV as a 
weighted sum of the functions (1A)-(1D):  
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where K =min{K1, K2, K3, K4}, K =max{K1, K2, K3, K4}, and a, b, c and d are weights measuring 
the relative impact on market value of hypotheses H1A-H1D, respectively, with a+b+c+d=1. 
To assess the impact of privatization (announcements) on a firm’s market value, we 
firstly need to establish the change in value, ΔMV, due to the (announced) change in state 
ownership, ΔG: ΔMV=MV(G2)-MV(G1), where G2=G1+ΔG and ΔG<0 due to state divesture 
(G2<G1). Using the functional form of MV in eq. (1E), we can analyze how changes in market 
value, ΔMV, depend on both the magnitude of announced privatization, ΔG, as well as on the 
initial level of state ownership, G1. For the former, we obtain:
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It can be shown that the above expression, i.e., the slope of ΔMV with respect to ΔG, is 
negative for both low (G< K ) and high (G> K ) values of G iff a>b+d. That is to say, globally 
(for all values of G observed) a negative slope would indicate that the political interference 
effect (H1A with weight a) is relevant for the firm’s market value, and that its impact on the 
firm’s valuation is stronger than the joint effect of the effective state block ownership (b) and 
of the preferential political treatment (d) they might receive. 
As for the dependence of changes in market value (ΔMV) on pre-announcement state 
ownership level G1, the following result can be obtained: 
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It can be shown that for low values of G, the relationship between ΔMV and G1 will be 
positive (negative) if c<0 (c>0), implying a negative (positive) impact of the likelihood of 
emergence of a concentrated block ownership on firm value. For high values of G, this 
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relationship will turn positive for a>b+d. Overall, these conditions imply that the function 
ΔMV=f(G1) will have a positive slope if the existence of private blockholders affects the value 
of a firm negatively (c<0) and the impact of the political interference effect is positive (a>0) 
and higher than that of the state blockholder effect (b) and of preferential political treatment 
(d) combined (a>b+d). The function will be V- or U-shaped iff the concentrated private 
ownership effect is positive (c>0) and the political interference effect is stronger than that of 
the state blockholder effect (b) and of preferential political treatment (d) combined.
16
  
Based on the above results, a finding of a negative relationship between ΔG and ΔMV 
will be interpreted as evidence in favor of a strong political interference hypothesis (H1A). In 
addition, a finding of a positive (U-shaped) relationship between G1 and ΔMV will be 
interpreted as evidence of the negative (positive) impact of private blockholding on firm value 
(H1C) as well as a strong political interference hypothesis (H1A). 
2.2. Liquidity- and control-related effects 
The second set of hypotheses is related to the liquidity aspect of share transfers and the ability 
of the stock market to effectively act as a controlling/monitoring device resulting there from. If 
beneficiaries of stock transfers decide to sell their holdings, this action can result in a large 
number of sell orders exerting a downward pressure on the stock price. Hence, the impact of 
the transfer announcement on a firm’s value could be negative. If, however, market 
participants value the long-term liquidity improvements resulting from shares sales more than 
the potential short-term price pressure (García and Ansón, 2007), their reaction to the 
announced transfer should be positive, resulting in an increase in the firm’s value
17
. Therefore, 
two further hypotheses can be formulated: 
H3. The expected short-term price pressure of sell orders decreases a firm’s value. 
H4. The expected long-term liquidity improvements increase a firm’s value. 
As further partial privatizations also increase liquidity and the ability of the stock 
market to effectively act as a controlling/monitoring device (Holmström and Tirole, 1993), by 
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accounting for the effect of the increased liquidity on market value we also control for the 
potential improvement in the monitoring ability of the market (the managerial view). Hence, 
any significant impact of the remaining, ownership related variables can be attributed to the 
effects captured by hypotheses H1A-D (including the political view encapsulated by H1A). 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
In this paper, we analyze stock price reactions of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange (WSE). The WSE was established in 1817 and, after the collapse of communism, re-
established in 1991 (it was closed during the WWI and WWII as well as during the communist 
era starting in 1945). Initially, only 5 companies (partly privatized former SOEs) were listed 
and trading took place in an auction system once a week. Subsequently, more companies 
entered the market, both former SOEs and newly established private enterprises, and a 
continuous trading system was introduced. In 1999, the year our sample starts, 221 companies 
were listed on the WSE, with the total capitalization of USD 30 billion, total annual turnover 
of USD 24 billion and a turnover ratio of 46%. The last transfer in our sample took place in 
2011, but the last using publicly traded firms was in 2005, a year when 255 companies were 
listed, with the end-of-year capitalization of 131 billion USD, annual turnover of 60.8 billion 
USD, and the turnover ratio of 25.9%. 
Data on stock prices, trading volumes and market index values were obtained from the 
Datastream and the WSE. Announcement dates and information about the shares to be 
transferred, transfer value, name of the beneficiary, and the government holdings in the to-be-
transferred companies were hand-collected from the electronic archives of the Polish Press 
Agency (Polska Agencja Prasowa, or PAP), Rzeczpospolita and Parkiet, both Polish daily 
newspapers, as well as being obtained from the Ministry of the Treasury, the Chancellery of 
the Prime Minister and the Polish Financial Supervision Authority. This process resulted in the 
identification of 65 events, i.e., announcements of transfers. However, the first transfer 
13 
 
recorded concerned convertible bonds rather than stocks, and all usable transfers in the period 
2006-2011 were of companies not listed on the stock exchange. For several further transfers 
the information was incomplete or the stocks subject to transfers were very thinly traded. 
These cases were excluded from further analysis, leaving us with a sample of 51 events
18
.  
The average value of transferred stocks amounts to PLN 63,734,048 (USD 16,365,562 
using the average exchange rate in 1999-2005) with the lowest value of PLN 4,097 (USD 
1,052), the highest value of PLN 606,606,000 (USD 155,763,660), and the total value of 
around PLN 3,250 mln (USD 834 mln). Stocks of industrial companies were most frequently 
used for transfers, with 25 transfers accounting for 21% of the total transfer value. However, 
seven transfers of stocks of the TP S.A., a telecommunication company, accounted for an even 
bigger fraction of the total transfer value (59%). Another noticeable 14% of the total transfer 
value stems from KGHM PM S.A., a company operating mostly in the copper mining and 
telecommunication sectors, and 12% from PEKAO, a bank. The banking sector accounted for 
21% of the total value of transfers. 
3.2. Methodology 
To measure stock market reactions to transfer announcements (an empirical equivalent of 
ΔMV), we calculate the cumulated abnormal returns for stocks of firms subject to transfers in 
the following way. Firstly, for each event (announcement), the estimation period starting 250 
trading days (approximately one calendar year) before the announcement and ending 11 
trading days before the announcement is defined: [T-250, T-11], where T=0 indicates the 
relative announcement day. Secondly, for each event ‘i’ the following market model for the 
daily stock return is estimated for this estimation period:  
tiktM
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where tiR ,  denotes the daily stock return for event ‘i’, i=1 to 51, at time ‘t’, ktMR -,  denotes the 
daily market return at time ‘t-k’, with the market being proxied by the all-shares value-
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weighted stock index WIG, ti ,e  represents the error term for event ‘i’ at time ‘t’, and a  and b  
are parameters.
19
 Thirdly, for each event ‘i’, the expected stock returns are estimated for the 
event period defined as [T-10; T+50] using the estimated market model (2), as follows: 
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where tiR ,
ˆ  denotes the estimated “expected” daily stock return for event ‘i’ at time ‘t’ and aˆ  
and bˆ  are estimated from the market model (2). Next, we calculate unexpected, or abnormal, 
returns for each event ‘i’ and day ‘t’ within the event window [T-10; T+50],  tiAR , , as: 
tititi RRAR ,,,
ˆ-=                                                    (4) 
Lastly, to assess the cumulative, impact of the event on the stock price, we calculate 
the cumulated abnormal returns for each event ‘i’ within the event window [T-10; T+50] as: 
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We consider an event window starting 10 working days prior to the announcement day 
rather than at T=0 to account for several effects: 1) possible information leakages prior to the 
announcement day; 2) the fact that government holdings in the listed companies are known to 
the public (making it easier to forecast which company’s shares will be transferred); 3) the 
approximated value of the transfer is also known since it is determined by the need of the 
beneficial, often expressed publicly. To account for a slow price adjustment of the stock 
prices, we consider a period of 50 working days after the announcement, i.e., a window [-10, 
50]. Alternative windows are also considered: [0, 5], [-10, 15], and [-10, 20]. 
It should be noted that, as we investigate cross-sectional differences among firms 
undergoing ownership change (rather than those between privatized and state-owned 
companies), the potential endogeneity of privatization decisions does not bias our results: even 
if companies with certain common characteristics were more likely to be transferred than 
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others, this common factor should not generate differences in cross-sectional price reactions to 
transfer announcements (Driffield and Du, 2007). 
3.3. Testing strategy 
Our first step in testing the above hypotheses empirically is to measure the stock market’s 
reaction to the announcement of share transfer, by calculating the cumulated abnormal returns 
(CARs) around the announcement days. However, based on the CARs it is not possible to 
draw conclusions about the hypotheses outlined above or about the effectiveness of 
privatization. This is due to the fact that theoretically CARs can be positive, negative, or zero, 
which results from the interplay of ownership and liquidity effects, and it is not possible to 
conclusively attribute the observed sign of CARs to one particular effect. 
To overcome this problem, we use regression analysis to distinguish between the 
aforementioned ownership and liquidity effects. As the dependent variable, we use CARs, a 
measure of the change in a firm’s value due to the announced stock transfer and an empirical 
proxy for the theoretical variable ΔMV. CARs are regressed on the following variables:  
· IMPACTi, which measures the potential impact of the transfer on price, i.e., the liquidity 
aspect of transfer announcements. This is equal to the product of the Amihud ratio 
(Amihud, 2002) and the monetary value of the transfer on announcement day. The Amihud 
ratio is defined as the average ratio of the absolute daily return to trading volume (in PLN) 
and expresses the average stock price reaction to a change in trading by one monetary unit. 
When multiplied by the value of the respective transfer, the Amihud ratio is a measure of 
illiquidity expressed in monetary terms and a proxy of a potential price reaction, should an 
order in size equal to the transfer’s value be executed. As a sale of transferred shares would 
increase the free float of the company, this variable is also related to the increased ability 
of the market to act as a monitoring mechanism.  
16 
 
· TRANSHAREi, expresses the fraction of a firm’s equity being transferred. This is used as a 
proxy for the theoretical variable ΔG and the shape of the relationship between this 
variable and CARs will be used to draw conclusions about the relevance of ownership-
related effects, as discussed in Section 2.1.  
· GOVSHAREi, equal to the total fraction of equity held by the government prior to the 
transfer announcement, a proxy of the variable G1.  
Hence, the following regression will be estimated: 
iiiii TRANSHAREGOVSHAREIMPACTCAR ebbbb ++++= 3210               (6) 
As the market reaction to transfer announcements hypothesized in (1E) could be a 
quadratic function of state ownership (if private blockholders improve firm value), we allow 
for this relationship by estimating the following regression: 
iiiiii TRANSHAREGOVSHAREGOVSHAREIMPACTCAR ebbbbb +++++= 3
2
2210 '      (7) 
Depending on the values of the parameters, inference will be made about the validity of 
the aforementioned hypotheses H1-H4. Firstly, a positive 1b  is expected if the benefits of 
higher liquidity in the long run (H4) outweigh the negative short-term price impact (H3), and 
negative otherwise. This variable also controls for the increasing ability of the more liquid 
market to monitor managers (the managerial view). Secondly, a U-shaped relationship 
between government shareholding prior to privatization and the market response to it will be 
observed if 2b  is negative and 2'b  is positive, which in turn can be interpreted as evidence of 
the market reacting positively to the reduction in political interference with the company 
(H1A) and of an increased likelihood of the emergence of a private blockholder increasing a 
firm’s value (H1C). Evidence in favour of H1A would also support the political view of 
privatization. The finding of both positive 2b  and insignificant 2'b , on the other hand, would 
still support the beneficial reduction of political interference but would also indicate that 
private block ownership is seen as detrimental to minority shareholders and a firm’s market 
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value. Lastly, negative 3b  is predicted by our model if the market values the reduction of 
harmful political interference more than the potential loss of preferential political treatment 
and risk of diluted ownership by the firm undergoing ownership transformation. 
3.4. Estimation techniques 
The basic method used in this study is the OLS regression, with standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). To check for the robustness of the OLS results, we also 
employ alternative estimation techniques. Firstly, to assess the functional form of the 
estimated equations, the Box-Cox transformation is undertaken. The method deals with 
problems of non-normality and heteroskedasticity of data (Sakia, 1992). In general, if Yi is the 
dependent variable and Xi,1-Xi,k are the regressors, it involves the estimation of the following 
equation: ikikii XXY ebbb
llq ++++= )(,
)(
1,10
)( ... , where: qqq /)1()( -= ii YY  and 
lll /)1( ,
)(
, -= kiki XX . The optimal powers θ and λ can be estimated along the remaining 
parameters and tested, e.g., against the Null of equality to one, i.e., linear vs. nonlinear form. 
Secondly, the least absolute deviations (LAD) method is also used to estimate 
regression (6). It is a special case of the quantile regression estimator (Kroenker and Bassett, 
1978; Dielman 2005) and minimizes the sum of absolute values of the residuals with respect to 
the coefficient vector b: å
=
-
n
i
ii
b
bXY
1
||min . By doing so, it estimates the effect of explanatory 
variables on the median rather than the mean of the dependent variable. The LAD estimator 
has been shown to be more desirable than the OLS when there is multicollinearity among 
variables, the errors follow a heavy-tailed distribution, and the data suffers from the existence 
of outliers (Narula et al., 1999). However, the closed-end formula for optimal parameter values 
does not exist. The optimization problem is solved by the use of the Barrodale-Roberts (1973) 
modified Simplex algorithm for linear programming. 
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Lastly, we also employ a two-stage estimation method by Hinich and Talwar (1975) 
which poses no requirements on the distribution of the error term and is robust to outliers (with 
the number of degrees of freedom chosen conservatively to be 10% of the sample size) 
4. Empirical results and discussion 
4.1. Features of independent variables 
Table 1 gives an overview of the main features of independent variables which describe 
selected features of transfer events. The average potential price impact of a hypothetical 
transaction in size of the whole transfer (IMPACTi) amounts to around 400% (change in stock 
price), and it varies enormously in the cross-section, mirroring homogeneity in liquidity across 
stocks. The average transfer (TRANSHAREi) represented 5.26% of the transferred company’s 
equity, but this number varied between 0.0003% and 26.50%. The data on the fraction of 
transferred equity is skewed to the right as most transfers involved a small proportion of 
equity: the median is 2.41% and the 75-th percentile is only 7.67%. Prior to the announcement, 
the government typically held directly 15.1% of the company subject to transfer 
(GOVSHAREi), but transfers were announced for firms with state ownership of between 
0.0003% and 75.59%. This variable is also skewed to the right, as the median state ownership 
is 10.18% and the 75-th percentile is 18%. Lastly, the average market capitalization of the 
company subject to transfer (SIZEi) was 4,323.88 PLN million, with strong differences among 
investigated companies. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2. Average stock price reaction to transfer announcements 
We consider the average value of CARs as a measure of a typical market reaction to the 
transfer announcement, with results reported in Table 2. For the shortest event window [0; 5], 
the mean CAR value is -1.13% and insignificant (Panel A). This indicates that the average 
market reaction to transfer announcements was not significantly different from zero. To 
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control for the possible impact of outliers, we calculate robust means: trimmed and 
windsorized, both by 3 observations at each end of the respective distribution. Based on the 
corresponding p-values (0.1049 and 0.114) we again fail to reject the hypothesis of CARs 
being equal to zero. Since some tests show evidence of non-normality (Panel B: Shapiro-Wilk 
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov indicate normality whereas Cramer-von Mises and Anderson-
Darling reject the normality of CARs in the [0; 5] window), we test for the significance of the 
median rather than the mean CAR using the sign test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Both 
procedures indicate (p-values of 0.4011 and 0.1162) that the median CAR is not significantly 
different from zero, either. Hence, based on the cross-section of CARs, we find no evidence 
that there was a systematic market reaction to transfer announcements. This result is consistent 
across CARs computed over alternative event windows of different widths. The evidence of 
non-zero skewness and excess kurtosis (Panel C) further highlights the non-normality of 
CARs, necessitating the use of alternative estimation methods (Section 3.4). 
 [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Even though on average the CARs are not different from zero, the price reactions to 
transfer announcements are far from uniform across events, with a considerable cross-sectional 
variation in individual CARs (Table 2, Panel C).  For instance, the cumulative reaction 
measured over six trading days on and following the event (CAR[0;5]) can be as low as -
13.6685% and as high as 18.2439%, with a considerable part of the distribution in the tails, as 
shown by the percentiles reported in Panel C. This cross-sectional variability in reactions to 
announcements is even more pronounced for CARs covering longer time horizons. Hence, it 
would seem premature to conclude that transfer announcements have had no impact on firm 
value (even though the average impact is insignificant). Rather, heterogeneity in price 
reactions suggests that various opposing factors contribute to the total effect, as hypothesized 
in section 2 and encapsulated by our simple model (6). We proceed to empirically analyze the 
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cross-sectional determinants of CARs to better understand the impact of ownership- and 
liquidity- related effects on firm value. 
4.3. Determinants of stock price reactions to transfer announcements 
To further analyze the effectiveness of ownership privatization, we estimate regression (6). 
Any measurement errors in CARs are captured by the constant and the error term. The results 
are presented in Table 3. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Panel A shows values of the OLS parameters. Firstly, the estimated value of 1b  is 
positive for all measures of CARs and significant for all but one. This result seems to be in line 
with hypothesis H4: the market expects the transferred shares to be sold on the stock exchange 
and to increase the liquidity of trading in the shares of the transferred companies. Less strictly, 
the finding of a positive coefficient can indicate that the expected positive impact of increasing 
liquidity in the long run (H4) exceeds the expected negative short-term price impact of the 
transfers (H3). Investors seem to value the potential gains from higher liquidity and the 
resulting improvement in the market’s ability to monitor managers (the managerial view). 
Secondly, higher pre-transfer levels of state ownership (GOVSHAREi) go hand in hand 
with stronger price reactions to transfer announcements, as indicated by positive and 
significant values of 2b . This is in line with the negative impact of concentrated private 
blockholding on firm value (H1C) as well as with the political interference hypothesis (H1A), 
as discussed in section 2. Lastly, the parameter 3b  is negative and significant for all CARs, 
indicating larger price drops if large fractions of firms are being transferred. As shown in 
section 2, this finding indicates that the effect of the political interference hypothesis H1A is 
stronger than the potential benefits from the state acting as a blockholder (H1B) and treating 
partially state-owned companies in a preferential way (H1D). This yields further support to the 
political view of privatization. 
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Overall, the results indicate that the privatization mode we are dealing with in this 
study tends to increase firm value due to the reduction of political interference with managerial 
decisions (the political view). At the same time, however, the emergence of private 
blockholders able to expropriate the minority shareholders rather than to monitor the managers 
is seen as value-reducing. Markets also positively value the potential increase in free float and 
stocks’ liquidity. The interplay between these often conflicting forces differs in each event, 
giving rise to the observed heterogeneity of individual stock price reactions (CARs) and to the 
insignificant market reaction on average. 
4.4. Robust estimations 
As the excess kurtosis in CARs is positive (Table 2, Panel C), the error distribution could 
suffer from heavy tails. In addition, there is a potential colinearity problem as correlations 
between some dependent variables are not negligible (Table 1, Panel D). Further, the range of 
the regressors’ values is considerable (Table 1), and some of the observations could be treated 
as statistical outliers. Therefore, we estimate the parameters of equation (6) using the least 
absolute deviations (LAD) method and present our results in Table 3, Panel D. The results are 
qualitatively identical regardless of the estimation method: parameters 1b  and 2b  are positive 
and 3b  is negative and the most significant, as was the case with the OLS results. 
In addition, to deal with the potential estimation problems due to non-normality and 
heteroskedasticity of data, as well as to allow for non-linearities in equation (6), we employ the 
Box-Cox transformation as described in section 2.4. Results reported in Table 3, Panel E, 
show that the estimated power for the LHS variable, θ, is not individually significantly 
different from one at the 5% significance level, as the 95% confidence intervals for θ always 
include that value of one. This suggests a correct specification of the LHS of equation (6). The 
powers for the RHS variables, λ, are significantly different from zero in two out of four cases. 
Overall these results suggest that the linear model (6) does not feature severe non-linearities. 
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However, the tests of joint equality of θ and λ to one suggest that the Null of θ=λ=1 should be 
rejected in three out of four cases. Therefore, we apply the transformations of all variables 
with power parameters as reported in Panel E and estimate the model (6) using transformed 
variables. Again, the result (Panel F) is of 1b  and 2b  being positive and 3b  being negative, 
and significant, as for the OLS estimates. 
Furthermore, the explanatory variables are moderately but significantly correlated 
(Table 1, panel D). Therefore, there exists a potential problem with multicollinearity. 
Admittedly, the variance inflation factors (VIF) for parameters 1b - 3b  are close to one (equal 
1.27, 1.12, and 1.4, respectively); however, we still want to account for the potential issues due 
to multicollinearity. Hence, we re-estimate equation (6) by OLS using different orders of 
orthogonalization of the independent variables, and the results are qualitatively robust (not 
reported to conserve space). Firstly, 1b  and 2b  are positive and 3b  is negative in virtually all 
model specifications, regardless of the order of orthogonalization and the time window the 
CARs variable covers. Secondly, most of 2b  and 3b  estimates are significant, whereas 1b  is 
significant in slightly fewer than half of all cases considered, especially for CARs computed 
over the [0; 5] and [-10; 50] windows. Overall, the results obtained with ortogonalized 
variables strongly support our previous conclusions. 
We also re-estimate equation (6) using an OLS-based procedure of Hinich and Talwar 
(1975) which is robust to large values of the error term (results not reported to conserve 
space). However, this approach does not identify any outliers for three of the CAR variables 
used and only one outlier for CARs measured over the interval [-10; 20]. In the latter case, the 
results are still virtually identical to the OLS ones, and highly significant.  
Overall, robust approaches confirm the results from OLS regressions. 
4.5. Robustness checks for functional misspecifications and omitted variables 
We test further for the correctness of the specification of equation (6) using the Lagrange 
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multiplier test (Engle, 1982). The results (Table 3, Panel B) indicate that the Null of no 
squared value cannot be rejected for any of the independent variables used, supporting the 
choice of a linear model ((6) is superior to (7)).  
It could be argued that our regression suffers from endogeneity biasing the values of 
the estimated coefficients. The endogeneity bias occurs if the dependent variable is correlated 
with the error term, which might result from two sources. Firstly, the bias can exist if one of 
the independent variables, e.g., GOVSHAREi, is driven by an external factor (e.g. pre-
announcement corporate performance) and this factor is in turn influenced by the dependent 
variable, i.e., CARs. However, given that our dependent variable CARs by construction 
measures the previously unexpected changes in prices, it cannot be argued to have influenced 
any factor observed in the past (including GOVSHAREi), as the unexpected future cannot 
influence the past. Therefore, this source of exogeneity bias can be ruled out. Secondly, the 
coefficients might suffer from the omitted variable bias. This can be analyzed by statistical 
tests and adding further potential determinants of CARs into the regression equation. 
The omitted variable bias is tested for by the Ramsey’s RESET test, which is an F-test 
on Ho: 0=q  in the regression: eqb ++= ZXy , where y is the dependent and X is a matrix 
of independent variables. Z was defined by Ramsey (1969) as [ 2ˆty ,
3ˆ
ty , …, 
1ˆ +p
ty ], i.e. a vector 
of predicted values of yt, and the F-statistic has p and T-k-p degrees of freedom, where T 
denotes the sample size and k the number of parameters in the above regression. Values of 
p=1, 2, 3 are common choices. Thursby and Schmidt (1977) show that defining Z as a vector 
of the squares, cubes, and fourth powers of the elements of X rather than yt constitutes a more 
powerful test against a non-specified model alternative.  We apply both versions of the test 
(denoted RESET1 and RESET2, respectively), with up to four powers of fitted y values and of 
dependent variables, and the results show no misspecification: only one statistic is significant 
at the 10% level (Table 3, Panel C). 
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We also test against specific forms of the omitted variable bias by adding additional 
variables into regression (6). Factors such as company size and industry affiliation influence 
privatization outcomes (D’Souza nad Megginson, 1999; D’Souza et al., 2005; Konings, 2005). 
As they might also be correlated with the pre-privatization state ownership, GOVSHARE, 
failure to include them could generate a bias (Boubakri et al., 2005b). In addition, the timing 
of transfers could be an important factor, as the market participants could have been learning 
that share transfers lead to privatization, and the macroeconomic and legal environment was 
changing over time (Boubakri et al., 2005a; Estrin, 2002). Therefore, we include additional 
variables to assess whether our main conclusions will be affected: SIZEi, measuring the 
average daily market capitalization of a company in the year prior to the announcement, 
TIMEi, a time trend, and four dummy variables to capture possible differences in CARs due to 
industry effects: for telecommunication, banking, industrial, and trade and services sectors (a 
dummy of energy companies is omitted). We add these variables as regressors, each of them 
separately and all jointly, and test for their significance by means of the t-test and the F-test 
(results not reported to preserve space). For all CARs, the additional variables are jointly 
insignificant. When added separately, most of them remain insignificant, too. The only 
exception is that the transfers of banks’ shares positively affect CARs over the [0; 5] horizon, 
and the trend is negative for CARs measures over the [-10; 20] horizon. Market capitalization 
of the transferred firm does have any significant impact on price reactions to transfer 
announcements. The overwhelming insignificance of these results indicates that the original 
model (6) captures the relevant determinants of CARs without a bias and does so rather well.  
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Our finding of the beneficial further privatization due to reduction in political interference 
(political view) is in line with some previous studies (Boubakri et al., 2005a; D'Souza and 
Megginson, 1999) and contradicts the results reported by other authors that a reduction in state 
ownership does not improve corporate performance, once the stock market based monitoring 
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has been introduced (Boubakri et al., 2004; D'Souza et al., 2005), or can be even detrimental to 
the firm’s value (Bortolotti and Facio, 2004). A possible explanation, apart from the 
methodological differences, is the higher quality of shareholder policy by the developed 
countries’ governments as compared with a transition country, so that the political interference 
does not negatively influence firms’ value. Moreover, companies analyzed in other studies can 
benefit from preferential political treatment (Bortolotti and Facio, 2004; Sun et al., 2002). The 
finding of negative impact of the potential emergence of a dominant shareholder supports the 
argument of private benefits of control obtainable on small shareholders’ expenses (Thomsen 
et al., 2006, Trojanowski, 2008).  
Based on these results, the policy makers should be aware that further privatizations 
can result in at least short-term increases in market value of companies, especially those with 
very large state ownership, as they are most likely to be exposed to political interference. 
However, based on our results we cannot infer about the long term impact on both market 
value and corporate performance: the observed short-term market reaction could be excessive 
and at least partially reversed in the longer run. Furthermore, some changes to social welfare 
might not be captured by changes in shareholder value. Moreover, the likelihood of 
expropriation of minority shareholders by blockholders should be reduced by effectively 
enforcing an appropriate corporate governance code protecting the former from the latter. 
Stock market liquidity should be enhanced, as illiquid stocks are considered to be more risky 
and carry an illiquidity premium, making it more expensive for companies to raise capital 
through equity issuance. However, due to the features of our approach (focus on short-term 
price movements, on capital market’s reactions rather than changes in accounting measures, on 
one country only), these recommendations may not have a general character and should be 
considered with caution.   
26 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the editor of this journal, Prof. Malcolm Sawyer, and two anonymous 
referees for their constructive comments and suggestions. Further, I thank David Barlow, 
Lynne Evans, Mike Jones-Lee, Roxana Radulescu, Dobromil Serwa, and Robert Sollis for their 
feedback. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 2009 CICM Conference, 
London Metropolitan University, London, UK; the 2008 CEF-QASS Conference on Empirical 
Finance, Brunel University, London, UK; and the 2008 Scottish Economic Society Meeting, 
Perth, UK. The usual disclaimers apply. 
 
References 
Amihud, Y. 2002. “Illiquidity and stock returns.” Journal of Financial Markets 5: 31–56. 
Amihud, Y., and H. Mendelson. 1986. “Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 17: 223-249. 
Barrodale, I., and F. D. K. Roberts. 1973. “An Improved Algorithm for Discrete l1 Linear 
Approximation.” SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis 10: 839-848. 
Bennett, J., and J. Maw. 2003. “Privatization. partial state ownership, and competition.” 
Journal of Comparative Economics 31: 58-74. 
Berle, A., and G. Means. 1932. The modern corporation and private property. New York: 
Macmillan.  
Bortolotti, B., and M. Faccio. 2004. “Government Control of Privatized Firms.” ECGI - 
Working Paper No. 40/2004. 
Boubakri, N., and J.-C. Cosset. 1998. “The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly 
Privatized Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries.” Journal of Finance 53: 
1081-1110. 
Boubakri. N., J.-C. Cosset, and O. Guedhami. 2004. “Privatization. corporate governance and 
economic environment: Firm-level evidence from Asia.” Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal 12: 65-90. 
Boubakri. N., J.-C. Cosset, and O. Guedhami. 2005a. “Liberalization, corporate governance 
and the performance of privatized firms in developing countries.” Journal of 
Corporate Finance 11: 767-790. 
Boubakri. N., J.-C. Cosset, and O. Guedhami. 2005b. “Postprivatization corporate 
governance: The role of ownership structure and investor protection.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 76: 369-399. 
27 
 
Boubakri. N., J.-C. Cosset, and O. Guedhami. 2008. “Privatisation in Developing Countries: 
Performance and Ownership Effects.” Development Policy Review 26: 275-308. 
Boycko, M., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1996. “A theory of privatization.” Economic Journal 
106: 309-319. 
Brennan, M. J., N. Jegadeesh, and B. Swaminathan.1993. “Investment analysis and the 
adjustment of stock prices to common information.” Review of Financial Studies 6: 
799-824. 
Chordia, T., and B. Swaminathan. 2000. „Trading volume and cross-autocorrelations in stock 
returns.” Journal of Finance 55: 913-935. 
Claessens, S. And S. Djankov. 1999. ”Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance 
in the Czech Republic.” Journal of Comparative Economics 27: 498–513. 
Datar, V. T., N. Y. Naik, and R. Radcliffe. 1998. “Liquidity and stock returns: An alternative 
test.” Journal of Financial Markets 1: 203-219. 
Demsetz, H. 1983. “The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm.” Journal of Law 
and Economics 26: 375– 394. 
Dielman, T. E. 2005. “Least absolute value regression: recent contributions.” Journal of 
Statistical Computation and Simulation 75: 263-286. 
Djankov, S., and P. Murrell. 2002. “Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative 
Survey.” Journal of Economic Literature 40: 739-792. 
DSouza, J., and W. L. Megginson. 1999. “The Financial and Operating Performance of 
Privatized Firms during the 1990s.” Journal of Finance 54: 1397-1438.  
DSouza, J., W. Megginson, and R. Nash. 2005. “Effect of institutional and firm-specific 
characteristics on post-privatization performance: Evidence from developed 
countries.” Journal of Corporate Finance 11: 747-766. 
Driffield, N., and J. Du. 2007. “Privatisation, State Ownership and Productivity: Evidence 
from China.” International Journal of the Economics of Business 14: 215-239. 
Earle, J. and S. Estrin, 1996. “Privatization versus Competition: Changing Enterprise 
Behavior in Russia,” London School of Economics, Center for Economic Performance 
Discussion Paper 316.  
Engle, R. F. 1982. “A General Approach to Lagrangian Multiplier Model Diagnostics.” 
Journal of Econometrics 20: 83-104. 
Estrin, S. 2002. “Competition and Corporate Governance in Transition.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 16: 101-124. 
28 
 
Estrin, S., J. Hanousek, E. Kočenda, and J. Svejnar. 2007. ”Effects of privatization and 
ownership in transition economics,” CERGE-EI Discussion Paper No. 2007-181. 
Faccio, M. 2006. “Politically connected firms.” American Economic Review 96: 369-386. 
Fan, J. P. H., T. J. Wong, and T. Zhang. 2007. “Politically connected CEOs, corporate 
governance, and post-IPO performance of Chinas newly partially privatized firms.” 
Journal of Financial Economics 84: 330-357. 
Frydman, R., C. Gray, M. Hessel, and A. Rapaczynski. 1999. “Why does privatization work? 
The impact of private ownership on corporate performance in the transition 
economies.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 1153-1191. 
García, L. C., and S. G. Ansón. 2007. “Governance and Performance of Spanish Privatised 
Firms.” Corporate Governance: An International Review 15: 503-519. 
Grosfeld, I., and I. Hashi, 2007. “Changes in Ownership Concentration in Mass Privatised 
Firms: Evidence from Poland and the Czech Republic.” Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 15: 520-534. 
Gupta, N. 2005. “Partial Privatization and Firm Performance.” Journal of Finance 60: 987-
1015. 
Hinich, M. J., and P. P. Talwar. 1975. “A simple method for robust regression.” Journal of 
the American Statistical Association 70: 113-119. 
Holderness, C. 2003. “A survey of blockholders and corporate control.” Economic Policy 
Review 9: 51– 63. 
Holmström, B., and J. Tirole. 1993. “Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring.” The 
Journal of Political Economy 101: 678-709 
Jelic, R., R. Briston, and W. Aussenegg. 2003. “The choice of privatization method and the 
financial performance of newly privatized firms in transition economies.” Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting 13: 905-940. 
Koenker, R. and G. Bassett. 1978. ”Regression quantiles.” Econometrica 46: 33– 50. 
Konings, J., P. Van Cayseele, and F. Warzynski. 2005. “The Effects of Privatization and 
Competitive Pressure on Firms Price-Cost Margins: Micro Evidence from Emerging 
Economies.” Review of Economics and Statistics 87: 124-134. 
Leibenstein, H. 1966. “Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency.” American Economic Review 
56 (3): 392–415 
Lins, K. V. 2003. “Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets.” Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 159-184. 
29 
 
Matsumura, T. 1998. “Partial privatization in mixed duopoly.” Journal of Public Economics 
70: 473-483. 
Maug, E. 1998. “Large shareholders as monitors: is there a trade-off between liquidity and 
control?” Journal of Finance 53: 65-98. 
Maw, J. 2002. “Partial Privatization in transition economies.” Economic Systems 26: 271-
282. 
Megginson, W. L., and J. Netter. 2001. “From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical 
Studies on Privatization.” Journal of Economic Literature 39: 321-389. 
Megginson, W. L., R. C. Nash, and M. van Randenborgh. 1994. “The Financial and 
Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical 
Analysis.” Journal of Finance 49: 403-52. 
Narula., S. C., P. H. N. Saldiva, C. D. S. Andre, S. N. Elian, A. F. Ferreira, and V. Capelozzi. 
1999. “The minimum sum of absolute errors regression: a robust alternative to the 
least squares regression.” Statistics in Medicine 18: 1401-1417. 
Pistor, K., M. Raiser, and S. Gelfer. 2000. “Law and Finance in Transition Economies.” The 
Economics of Transition 8: 325–368. 
Ramsey, J. B. 1969. “Tests for Specification Errors in Classical Linear Least-Squares 
Regression Analysis.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B 31: 350-371. 
Sakia, R. M. 1992. “The Box-Cox transformation technique: A review.” The Statistician 41: 
169-178. 
Sheshinski, E., and L. F. López-Calva. 2003. “Privatization and Its Benefits: Theory and 
Evidence,” CESifo Economic Studies 49: 429–459. 
Shleifer, A. 1998. “State versus private ownership.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 12: 
133-150. 
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1994. “Politicians and Firms.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 109: 995-1025. 
Sun, Q., W. H. Tong, and S. J. Tong. 2002. “How Does Government Ownership Affect Firm 
Performance? Evidence from Chinas Privatization Experience.” Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting 29: 1–27. 
Thomsen, S., T. Pedersen, and H. Kvist. 2006. „Blockholder ownership: Effects on firm 
value in market and control based governance systems.” Journal of Corporate 
Finance 12: 246-269. 
30 
 
Thursby, J. G., and P. Schmidt. 1977. “Some Properties of Tests for Specification Error in a 
Linear Regression Model.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 72: 635-
641. 
Tirole, J. 1991. “Privatization in Eastern Europe: Incentives and the economics of transition.” 
In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, edited by O. Blanchard and S. Fisher, 221-
259. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Trojanowski, G. 2008. “Equity block transfers in transition economies: Evidence from 
Poland.” Economic Systems 32: 217-238. 
Vickers, J., and G. Yarrow. 1988. Privatization: An Economic Analysis. Cambridge. MA: 
MIT Press. 
Vickers, J., and G. Yarrow. 1991. “Economic Perspectives on Privatization.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 5: 111-132. 
White, H. 1980. “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct 
Test for Heteroskedasticity.” Econometrica 48: 817-38. 
World Bank. 2005. Corporate Governance Country Assessment: Poland. Reports of the 
Observance of Standards and Codes ROSC: Corporate Governance. 
Xu, X., and Y. Wang. 1997. “Ownership Structure. Corporate Governance. and Corporate 
Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies,” World Bank,World Bank 
Working Paper 1794. 
Zingales, L. 1995. “What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?” The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 110: 1047-1073. 
31 
 
Figure 1. Predicted stylized relationships between the level of state ownership in 
companies subject to the transfer (G) and their market value (MV). 
 
Panel A: Political interference hypothesis (H1A) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Concentrated state ownership hypothesis (H1B) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Concentrated private ownership hypothesis (H1C) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Preferential treatment hypothesis (H1D) 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
 
 IMPACTi GOVSHAREi TRANSHAREi SIZEi 
Panel A: Tests of location 
Mean 399.8841 0.151 0.0526 4323.8781 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Trimmed mean 296.7233 0.1317 0.044 3455.0054 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0016 
Windsorized Mean 337.2607 0.1423 0.0489 4176.5892 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 
Median 106.6819 0.1018 0.0241 450.7022 
Sign test (p-value) <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Wilcoxon signed-
rank test (p-value) 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel B: Test of normality (p-values) 
Shapiro-Wilk 0 0 0 0 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov <.0100 <.0100 <.0100 <.0100 
Cramer-von Mises <.0050 <.0050 <.0050 <.0050 
Anderson-Darling <.0050 <.0050 <.0050 <.0050 
Panel C: Selected characteristics of the distribution 
Standard deviation 618.1462 0.1557017 0.0674528 6841.603 
Skewness 2.30645 1.784565 1.576812 1.637582 
Kurtosis 8.802283 6.507098 4.796873 4.238941 
Minimum 0.012228 3.00*10
-06
 3.00*10
-06
 7.08388 
10
th
 Percentile 0.761632 0.011 0.0001 26.52372 
25
th
 Percentile 8.511721 0.04679 0.004578 85.76016 
75
th
 Percentile 649.8399 0.18 0.0767 5079.857 
90
th
 Percentile 1065.775 0.3518 0.1614 18705.4 
Maximum 3015.387 0.7559 0.265 22420.99 
Panel D: Correlations (p-values in parentheses) 
IMPACTi 1 (<.0001)    
GOVSHAREi 
0.1108 
(0.4387) 
1 (<.0001)   
TRANSHAREi 
0.4613 
(0.0007) 
0.3232  
(0.0207 ) 
1 (<.0001)  
SIZEi 
-0.2458 
(0.0821) 
0.0797 
(0.5782) 
-0.3494 
(0.0120) 
1 (<.0001) 
Note: Trimmed (windsorized) mean computed after removing (replacing) 3 observations on each end 
of the respective distribution. IMPACTi measures the potential price impact of a transaction 
order equal in size to the transfer (in %), GOVSHAREi is the fraction of equity owned by the 
government prior to the transfer, and TRANSHAREi is the fraction of the firm’s total equity being 
transferred; SIZEi, measures the average daily market capitalization of a company in the year 
prior to the announcement (in PLN million). 
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Table 2. Characteristics of CARs 
 
 CARs 
 [0; 5]  [-10; 15] [-10; 20] [-10; 50] 
Panel A: Tests of location 
Mean -0.0113 -0.0082 -0.0294 -0.0092 
p-value 0.2032 0.6132 0.1978 0.7591 
Trimmed mean -0.0142 -0.0099 -0.0209 0.0016 
p-value 0.1049 0.5508 0.2533 0.9532 
Windsorized Mean -0.0139 -0.0046 -0.0178 0.0267 
p-value 0.114 0.7806 0.3312 0.8678 
Median -0.0119 -0.0334 -0.0425 0.0181 
Sign test (p-value) 0.4011 0.0489 0.0919 1 
Wilcoxon signed-
rank test (p-value) 
0.1162 0.3116 0.2021 0.8898 
Panel B: Test of normality (p-values) 
Shapiro-Wilk 0.0918 0.011 0.0006 0.0117 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.0477 <.0100 0.0339 0.0207 
Cramer-von Mises 0.236 <.0050 0.0102 0.0096 
Anderson-Darling 0.1679 <.0050 <.0050 0.007 
Panel C: Selected characteristics of the distribution 
Standard deviation 0.0626569 0.1150695 0.1609552 0.2135532 
Skewness 0.6056907 0.2633135 -0.9986854 -0.6945545 
Kurtosis 4.124555 3.477643 6.443509 4.551301 
Minimum -0.136685 -0.342239 -0.644159 -0.625357 
10
th
 Percentile -0.080419 -0.123349 -0.160901 -0.244011 
25
th
 Percentile -0.051886 -0.071842 -0.097036 -0.098232 
75
th
 Percentile 0.018511 0.054595 0.075285 0.125959 
90
th
 Percentile 0.058692 0.176117 0.174379 0.25081 
Maximum 0.182439 0.251302 0.308129 0.498642 
Panel D: Correlations (p-values in parentheses) 
CAR [0; 5] 1 (<.0001)    
CAR [-10; 15] 
0.5872  
(<.0001) 
1 (<.0001)   
CAR [-10; 20] 
0.5302  
(<.0001) 
0.8162 
(<.0001) 
1 (<.0001)  
CAR [-10; 50] 
0.4347  
(0.0014) 
0.5343 
(<.0001) 
0.649 
(<.0001) 
1 (<.0001) 
Note: Trimmed (windsorized) mean computed after removing (replacing) 3 observations on each end 
of the respective distribution. 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 3. Regression results for equation (6). Dependent variable: CARi, computed over four 
alternative event windows. Sample size n=51. 
 
CARs: [0;5] [-10;15] [-10;20] [-10;50] 
Panel A: OLS regression results 
 Estimate  t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
0b  -0.02164 -1.62905 -0.032062 -1.44602 -0.057191** -2.19928 -0.0020574 -0.07016 
1b  x10-05 2.036 1.61503 7.12449*** 2.91505 8.64975*** 3.40342 6.9187* 1.74152 
2b  0.159577* 1.705 0.297035*** 2.72768 0.446614*** 3.51533 0.453565*** 2.73205 
3b  -0.416091*** -3.06296 -0.939617*** -4.91991 -1.41009*** -3.46833 -1.96223*** -3.35091 
F 4.36924***  6.96989***  7.78236***  6.75527***  
R2 0.21807  0.307904  0.331884  0.30128  
Panel B: Lagrange multiplier test (Engle, 1982). H0: no squared value of the respective RHS variable in eq. (6) 
 Test statistic: p-value: Test statistic: p-value: Test statistic: p-value: Test statistic: p-value: 
IMPACTi
2 1.204742 0.27238 0.8697325 0.35103 0.4808027 0.48806 0.7814856 0.37669 
GOVSHAREi
2 0.885594 0.34667 5.35E-02 0.81716 7.94E-02 0.77806 3.37E-03 0.95372 
TRANSHAREi
2 0.454679 0.50012 1.274938 0.25884 2.604529 0.10656 1.010559 0.31477 
Panel C: Ramsey’s RESET tests for omitted variables 
 Test statistic: p-value: Test statistic: p-value: Test statistic: p-value: Test statistic: p-value: 
RESET1 0.77 0.5187 0.6 0.6155 1.45 0.2425 2 0.1272 
RESET2 0.97 0.4782 1.38 0.2325 0.92 0.5151 1.88 0.0853 
Panel D: LAD regression results 
 Estimate  t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
0b  -0.011319 -1.2738 -0.021359 -1.37845 -0.038833* -1.99913 -0.0012523 -0.04538 
1b  x10-05 1.7515  1.63507 7.64857*** 4.09465 9.93893*** 4.2443 2.6423  0.794236 
2b  0.089354** 2.24097 0.118983* 1.7113 0.25061*** 2.87522 0.45609*** 3.68317 
3b  -0.389807*** -3.78097 -0.780848*** -4.34349 -1.10001*** -4.8809 -1.13782*** -3.55364 
R2 0.193861  0.257981  0.297729  0.264115  
Panel E: Box-Cox transformation tests  
Θ 0.7497338  0.8812563  1.370241  1.079335  
up95CI 1.028501  1.159965  1.772556  1.416583  
down95CI 0.470967  0.6025471  0.9679261  0.7420861  
Λ 0.951949  0.3504615  0.4632226  1.006359  
up95CI 2.321259  0.6814817  0.7940253  1.676557  
down95CI -0.4173613  0.0194412  0.1324199  0.3361621  
H0: θ = λ=1 
(p-value) 
0.099  0.038  0.005  0.637  
Panel F: Box-Cox transformed regression results 
 Estimate  t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
0b  0.256982*** 10.7697 0.361365*** 9.53906 0.331138*** 12.3989 0.557606*** 20.0058 
1b  x10-05  5.08102* 1.71863 486.076*** 2.67376 238.585*** 3.13382 6.26073* 1.75306 
2b  0.240235* 1.78474 0.126643*** 3.2991 0.171531*** 3.81843 0.439761*** 2.69428 
3b  -0.636868*** -3.01687 -0.220789*** -5.04939 -0.329259*** -5.41034 -1.86246*** -3.45399 
F 3.93287**  8.53971***  11.4429***  6.72162***  
R2 0.200662  0.352788  0.422098  0.300229  
 
Note: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Parameters are from the regression (6): 
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iiiii TRANSHAREGOVSHAREIMPACTCAR ebbbb ++++= 3210 ,  
where IMPACTi measures the potential price impact of a transaction order equal in size to the transfer, 
GOVSHAREi: fraction of equity owned by the government prior to the transfer, and TRANSHAREi: 
fraction of the firm’s total equity being transferred. RESET1 refers to the Ramsey RESET test using 
up to four powers of the fitted values of the dependent variable whereas RESET2 to the test using the 
powers of the independent variables. ‘up95CI’ (‘down95CI’) refers to the upper (lower) bound of the 
95% confidence interval. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The legal basis for this policy was the Act of August 30, 1996 on Commercialisation and 
Privatisation (Journal of Laws No. 171 / 2002, item 1397 with subsequent amendments), 
especially Article 33(3). Each transfer had to be approved by the Council of Ministers and 
executed by the Minister of the Treasury. 
2 Throughout this paper, by ‘firm value’ we mean the stock market value, or market capitalization, of 
a firm. Short-term changes in market value are used to measure the benefits of announced policy 
measures. This implicitly assumes that the stock market reacts rationally, i.e., instantaneously 
and correctly, to future implications of those measures for firm’s cash-flows etc. This 
assumption is not undisputed, especially for an emerging economy, as investors might over- or 
underreact to news, especially in the short term. In addition, the impact of privatizations on 
public welfare might not be accurately captured by changes in private benefits captured by 
shareholders. We thank the Editor and a referee for pointing this out. 
3 In the context of our study, by the new owner we mean the final buyer of the stocks on the market, 
not the intermediate beneficiary of the transfer, e.g., an underperforming and undercapitalised 
SOE. 
4 This is not to say that private owners’ ability to control and incentivise managers is perfect: as the 
recent experiences of misreporting and financial crisis indicate, managers can try to enrich 
themselves through manipulation of publicly available information about their companies or 
pursuit of short-term, high-risk goals rather than focus on long-term profitability and economic 
sustainability of their companies. Therefore, the validity of this argument for privatisation will 
be tested empirically. 
5 Partial privatization can be motivated by intertemporal maximization of revenues, enhancement of 
the restructuring by wealth-constrained investors, screening of potential buyers, signalling 
commitment to non-expropriation, and different market structures (Bennett and Maw, 2003; 
Matsumura, 1998, Maw, 2002). 
6 Of course, any transfer of shares constituting further partial privatization also implies increased 
liquidity and improved monitoring by the stock market (Holmström and Tirole, 1993). However, 
the biggest change to monitoring takes place following the initial flotation, not the subsequent 
changes analyzed here. Therefore, we expect the changes in ownership to have a far greater 
impact on firms than the liquidity aspect, and discuss the latter separately in the next subsection. 
In addition, we account for each of these simultaneous changes in liquidity and ownership in our 
empirical model. 
7 At the time of transfer announcement, it is not certain that it will lead to privatization, as transferred 
stocks can also be returned under direct government control. At the very least, a transfer implies 
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a temporary weakening of direct government control over the transferred company; at best it 
results in privatization. Due to this uncertainty of the final outcome, if transfer announcements 
resulted in significant effects, this would strengthen any arguments the findings support, as with 
certain privatizations the effects would be even stronger. 
8 Empirically, we also control for the motion that transfers followed by stock sales can improve 
private monitoring through improvements to free-float and liquidity (the managerial view). 
9 Needless to say, this, and the following, functions are not supposed to be an exact description of the 
relationships hypothesized. Rather, they depict selected general features of these relationships, 
such as the sign and changes in magnitude for different levels of state ownership, which can be 
conjectured from the theoretical and empirical literature. The crucial issue is that the 
relationships hypothesized under 1A to 1D, when combined, allow for distinguishing between 
existence vs. nonexistence and linearity vs. non-linearity of the link between state ownership and 
price reaction. The exact form of these individual or combined functions is irrelevant for our 
purpose. 
10 The term control privatization is used in the literature to describe state divestures of more than 50% 
of equity (Boubakri et al., 2004, 2008). However, this use is inconsistent with the agency theory 
which states that the owners, especially the state is unable to fully control managers even when 
it holds 100% of equity. Hence, it cannot be argued that by selling less than 50% the government 
retains control over a company whereas by selling more it relinquishes it. The very problem with 
state ownership is that the government has only limited control due to agency problems, 
regardless of the level of state ownership. 
11 Indeed, Grosfeld and Hashi (2007) show that following Polish mass privatization, ownership 
concentration increased as new owners attempted to gain influence on managerial decisions and 
improve companies’ profitability.  
12 Pistor et al. (2000) reports a good protection of minority shareholders against blockholders in 
Poland, compared to other transition economies, and a report of the World Bank (2005) on 
Polish governance framework assesses its compliance with the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance on equitable treatment of shareholders as "largely observed". 
13 K3 has to be below 50% (state as a minority shareholder) to allow for the emergence of private 
blockholders, especially given the prevailing one-share-one-vote policy (World Bank, 2005). 
14 Demsetz (1983) argues that ownership structure has no impact on firms’ value in equilibrium. 
Empirical studies show that ownership concentration has little to no impact on firm value in the 
US and the UK but impact negatively firms in continental Europe (Holderness, 2003, Thomsen 
et al., 2006). 
15 Derivation details available on request. 
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16 As we expect the slope for the intermediate levels of G ( K <G< K ) to change smoothly from 
negative to positive, a U shape seems more realistic to expect. 
17 Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Datar et al. (1998), Amihud (2002), among others, report a 
significant negative relationship between liquidity and expected returns. 
18 The sample size is comparable to those used in other studies, e.g., Gupta (2005): 42 firms, or García 
and Ansón (2007): 16 firms.  A small sample size can be seen as a trade-off of using a new, 
unique dataset and avoiding data mining, and is dealt with by appropriate statistical methods. 
19 The number of lags equal five for the analysis of daily returns was chosen to account for the well-
known day-of-the-week effects in returns, a common practice in the literature (see, e.g., Brennan 
et al. (1993), Chordia and Swaminathan (2000)) 
 
 
 
